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Further, as this article explores, egalitarians have principled reasons to find incorporating responsibility desirable aside from the political advantages of doing so, ranging from concerns about fairness to valuing choice, respect, or autonomy.
Yet the view most commonly associated with combining equality and responsibility, of luck egalitarianism, is beset with objections. On one standard formulation, luck egalitarians hold that it is unjust if some do worse than others through no fault or choice of their own but, insofar as inequalities are the result of choice, they are not unjust. 2 Challenges facing this position range from the accusation that its implications are too harsh in leaving people to bear the costs of their choices; to claims that no choice is free from the influence of luck and that, as such, the distinction between luck and responsibility cuts 'too deep'; to arguments from social egalitarians that proponents of luck egalitarianism fail to be true egalitarians.
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This article, however, proposes an alternative approach to understanding responsibility and incorporating it into egalitarianism to that prevalent among luck egalitarians. To do so, I
will not rehearse the many existing criticisms of luck egalitarianism. Instead, I offer an 2 approach to catering to responsibility that is grounded on our responsibility practices and which egalitarians should find more palatable and better motivated than standard forms of luck egalitarianism. Indeed, my approach is one that should appeal even to the social egalitarians who are amongst luck egalitarianism's critics. In contrast, the prevalent approach to responsibility among luck egalitarians will be shown to miss out on the very reasons to find catering to responsibility significant for justice.
One might argue that, nonetheless, this paper offers but one more variant of luck
egalitarianism. Yet, while on one characterisation luck egalitarianism's central claim is that justice demands that we eliminate or mitigate the effects of brute luck on people's prospects, my approach instead defends our responsibility practices and their potentially egalitarian character. By 'responsibility practices', I refer to the ways in which we hold each other responsible across a variety of situations, including, for example, editorials condemning those who claim benefits without desiring to reciprocate in any way; holding someone responsible for the healthcare costs of their expensive lifestyle choices; resenting companies who avoid tax or praising those who contribute to the social good. A responsibility practice consists of a set of conditions for holding people responsible in a certain context, along with associated reactive attitudes such as resentment, pride or shame, and consequences such as praise or blame, benefits or burdens. 4 Whether my approach remains a form of luck egalitarianism I take to be a terminological debate of little importance, but I describe my position as a form of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism to emphasise its focus on responsibility practices, and so on relations among citizens rather than on factors of luck. 5 To begin, section 1 outlines two approaches to understanding responsibility and incorporating it into egalitarianism: one based on our responsibility practices, the other that prevalent among luck egalitarians. I then defend adopting the practice-based approach to responsibility when incorporating considerations of responsibility within egalitarianism.
Section 2 argues that adopting a practice-based approach better captures the reasons responsibility is significant for justice than does the prevalent approach among luck egalitarians: the values of fairness, choice and respect, along with instrumental benefits.
Finally, section 3 addresses the one remaining motivation of the approach prevalent among luck egalitarians, that it accommodates the force of the claim that people's prospects should be free of luck. I argue that this anti-luck motivation is both impoverished and especially prone to a sceptical problem.
Two approaches
Luck egalitarians, for the most part, assume that who is responsible is a question to be settled externally to their normative commitments. 6 Some do so explicitly, deferring to moral philosophers or metaphysicians to answer when inequalities are chosen and so something for which people are responsible. To illustrate, consider Cohen's argument that implementing luck egalitarianism requires an account of 'genuine choice', which 'subordinates political philosophy to metaphysical questions', such as the outcome of the free will debate (1989, p. 934) . Alternatively, consider Carl Knight's suggestion that a just society will use committees including metaphysicians to determine when people are responsible (2006, pp.185-188 Dworkin's distinction between ambitions and endowments might stem from a normative conception of how to divide luck from responsibility to reflect equal concern and respect for all (e.g. 2002b, esp. p. 106) . 9 Yet, this article's purpose is not to demonstrate in turn that each variant of luck egalitarianism is equally prone to the arguments to follow. Instead, I claim that the metaphysical approach described above is both prevalent among luck egalitarians and, in the following sections, argue that it is especially vulnerable to the challenge that it fails to reflect what is valuable. Furthermore, those luck egalitarians who permit some role for value still face a form of this challenge: I will suggest that there are a wide range of reasons to find responsibility significant for justice and Dworkin's approach in particular may be too inflexible to accommodate that range. Conversely, failing to hold a person responsible for the costs of her choices can be a form of disrespect for her agency in a way that should concern liberal egalitarians. Some think paternalism is objectionable precisely because it is a form of disrespect for someone's agency, expressed through not letting her bear the costs of her choice. 13 So too, Stemplowska examines the opposite side of the relation between responsibility and respect. Holding the reckless responsible for the costs of their actions, rather than society having to bear the costs, helps to ensure that all respect their co-citizens as moral equals: imposing burdens on others through one's 'unreasonably wasteful or reckless' choices can be a form of disrespect (2011, p. 130 ).
14 Thus, there are two competing approaches to responsibility within egalitarianism, distinguished by the differing role they give to values. On the practice-based approach, political philosophers must get their hands dirty and determine which responsibility practices are valuable given their normative commitments and, given that, when people are to be held responsible. On the metaphysical approach, determining when to hold people responsible is either a task to be left to others, or a question to be answered aside from their normative commitments.
As such, there is also one further difference between the two approaches. As Arneson notes, prevalent forms of luck egalitarianism are best characterised as 'asocial': holding that the demands of justice do not depend on pre-existing social relations nor social interactions (2011, p. 49) . Further, on the metaphysical approach, determining who is responsible concerns individuals: one must ask, is this particular individual responsible for her choice? In contrast, the responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism I propose is best characterised as fundamentally 'social': determining who is responsible and for what requires that we address which forms of responsibility practice have value and, further, one of the central ways in which a responsibility practice can have value is in shaping our social relations. Hence, this approach to responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism is one that places the central concern of social egalitarianism -the nature of relations among citizens -at its heart. The rest of this article defends the attractiveness of the practice-based approach for those liberal egalitarians who find catering to responsibility appealing.
Capturing the significance of responsibility
Against the practice-based approach, one might object that how responsibility is practised, and which responsibility practices most neatly fit with one's moral and political values, is not what should be of concern when considering questions of justice. Instead, one should be 8 concerned with when people are really responsible: a fact of the matter independent of one's theory of justice. This is just what those who hold a metaphysical approach to responsibility suppose. I now offer two defences of a practice-based approach against this challenge.
First, one can doubt that analysing our practices of responsibility fails to tell us how responsibility really is: how responsibility really is -our metaphysical account -is derived from our practices. Once we engage in responsibility practices, there can be a sense in which I am 'really' responsible and so a fact as to whether I am responsible. However, that sense is derivative of our practices. 15 Furthermore, to see the metaphysical account as derived from practice like this fits with the most common way in which metaphysical conceptions of responsibility are designed: of offering a series of often bizarre examples such as a man with a chip in his brain, then taking the intuitions provoked by these examples to be evidence for one conception of responsibility over another (e.g. Fischer, 1999) . Where but from our practices of responsibility are our intuitions about responsibility supposed to come from?
Second, as the rest of this section argues, regardless of whether there is some more fundamental project of determining how responsibility 'really' is beyond analysing our practices, that is not something with which responsibility-sensitive egalitarians should concern themselves. By virtue of deviating from how responsibility is practiced, an approach that focuses on how responsibility 'really' is undermines the very reasons one might be a responsibility-sensitive egalitarian in the first place. In contrast, these motivations are accommodated within a practice-based approach. In so doing, I also suggest that there are a plurality of ways in which responsibility practices can be valuable. To make this argument, I
will consider the core motivations of the most prevalent kind of responsibility-sensitive egalitarian: luck egalitarians.
Before I begin, however, I make two comments on the motivations of responsibilitysensitive egalitarianism considered. First, I do not address reasons why equality should be the default such that, absent of justification otherwise, all should get equal shares. Instead, I
address reasons why being responsible for some inequality justifies that inequality: reasons to be a responsibility-sensitive egalitarian rather than another form of egalitarian. Second, luck egalitarians do not regard responsibility as an external constraint on an egalitarian conception of justice, but rather a fundamental component of that conception. Thus, the reasons addressed below are reasons for responsibility to be one such fundamental component:
reasons grounded on core liberal egalitarian values.
1. On the value of choice
First, I consider those who motivate a responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism through appeal to the value of choice. As Stemplowska comments, some luck egalitarians are 'pro-choicist' as well as 'anti-luck '(2012, p. 389 Joe knows, however, that he would have a better life were he to work longer hours, so he could afford to buy a house rather than live in a string of mouldy rented flats. 16 I assume that Joe is correct that he would be better off working longer hours, since the cost to him of no longer pursuing his art would not outweigh the benefit of having satisfactory and secure housing.
However, suppose Joe is a member of a luck egalitarian society that holds a metaphysical approach to responsibility. Suppose that, on the 'correct' metaphysical account of responsibility, whatever that turns out to be, Joe is not 'really' responsible for his choice.
Instead, his apparent choice is really the consequence of his overly hippy upbringing failing to instil any work ethic in Joe to the extent that he could not have done otherwise; or that he was rendered insufficiently responsive to the relevant reasons when it comes to choice of profession; or fill out the example using your preferred account of 'real' responsibility. Such metaphysical luck egalitarians would conclude that there is a reason of justice to hold that costs associated with Joe's choice, of having insufficient income to secure satisfactory housing, should be mitigated or even removed altogether. The outcome of having insufficient income to obtain satisfactory housing would be regarded as reflecting brute luck of upbringing, not any real choice. Observe that an assumption of the example is that whatever Joe's upbringing needs to be like to mitigate his responsibility for his work choices, obtains.
However, the example of Joe illustrates that through deviating from practice the metaphysical approach to responsibility is liable to fail to capture why catering to choice is valuable. If Joe's distributive shares fail to reflect his choice, since the state corrects for any difference in income or welfare between Joe and his co-citizens, then Joe is no longer the selfsacrificing artist he considers himself to be. Nor does Joe succeed in representing himself as such to his co-citizens, who will know that the state makes good the difference. As such, I
suggest that Joe's choice has lost its value to him. Scanlon's case of the religious believer being compensated for feeling religion-inspired guilt (1986, pp. 116-7) . However, while one's response to that case might be that religious choices are somehow different to other kinds of choices, here I make a more general claim that the reasons to value choice, or to make distributions choice-sensitive, tracks our practices and not our metaphysics. As such, taking a metaphysical approach to responsibility clashes with one rationale for being a luck egalitarian.
I now consider three objections to the above: the first objecting that luck egalitarians can accommodate the value of choice as characterised above; the second two objecting to that characterisation. First, then, one might object that the value Joe attaches to bearing the costs of his choice and the desire not to disrespect one's citizens can be accommodated within a metaphysically-inclined luck egalitarianism. In particular, the value of choice or of equal respect provides reason not to distribute in a way that tracks responsibility, such that one would not correct for Joe's disadvantage, despite the fact that he is not responsible for that disadvantage. 20 However, to reply, the above would not enable the proponent of a metaphysical approach to capture the value of choice in the required sense. The value of choice was meant to justify the significance of responsibility and its role within egalitarian theory, not to constrain that distributive scheme which would otherwise track responsibility. To conclude this part of the argument, luck egalitarians who adopt a metaphysical approach to responsibility would struggle to ground their theories on the value of choice, at least as characterised by Scanlon. Instead, the value of choosing is inherent in the practice. It does not depend on whether that practice tracks how responsibility 'really' is and whether one 'really' chooses. A luck egalitarian may respond, however, that the value of choice is not the most central justification of being a luck egalitarian. I now address that more prevalent justification. Section 3 then considers whether there is any further motivation for luck egalitarianism on the grounds that it is 'anti-luck'.
On fairness
Cohen regards one of the distinguishing features of luck egalitarianism to be that 'its Such comparative examples of feckless and hardworking individuals are a common way for luck egalitarians to introduce and motivate their theories. 22 Another set of popular examples that are taken to suggest that luck egalitarianism is underpinned by intuitions of fairness are cases where we are asked whether the prudent should have to pay for the repeated imprudence of others. 23 However, I now cast doubt on whether fairness can motivate responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism if one holds a metaphysical approach to responsibility.
To begin, I outline the purported relation between fairness and responsibility.
Examples that take the form of counterposing a hardworking individual to a feckless one, or a prudent individual to an imprudent one, are designed to make it appear that what motivates our intuitions about fairness is whether someone is really responsible. We are supposed to assume that the individuals described are responsible for the salient features: being hardworking or prudent, or failing to be so. Crucially, that assumption supposedly does the work in making us think it unfair if the hardworking and lazy do equally well, or the prudent person has to pay for the imprudent. In particular, if whether an individual is responsible changes, through adding detail to the case or correcting our conception of responsibility, then so too must our intuitions of fairness. Otherwise, the metaphysically-inclined luck egalitarian fails to offer an account inspired by fairness.
However, there is an alternative explanation of the intuitions about fairness surrounding the hardworking and the prudent: it is fair for the hardworking to do better than the lazy precisely because one is hardworking and the other lazy, and it is fair for the prudent to do better than the imprudent precisely because of their differing degrees of prudence.
Furthermore, such judgements are largely insensitive to whether people are 'really' responsible for these features. To illustrate, consider that we tend to praise those who work hard, without asking if they are 'really' responsible. So too, knowing that one's degree of financial prudence is heavily influenced by parental behaviour does not undermine the intuition that it is unfair if savers are penalised and imprudent borrowers rewarded, as when interest rates are kept down.
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Likewise, consider the debate over families where every generation is on benefits, who are the subjects of a great deal of discussion, although in reality rare. It seems likely that members of such families are, on average, less responsible than other benefits claimants, metaphysically-speaking. Many luck egalitarians accept the relevance of upbringing or family norms as excusing factors when attributing responsibility (e.g. Arneson, 1997; Roemer, 1993, e.g. p. 152 ). Yet this group of families where all generations are unemployed has been regarded as among the least deserving, and the benefits paid to these families, the most unfair (e.g. Mail Online 2008).
As such, intuitions of fairness can be interpreted as reflecting value judgements about how citizens should behave and what burdens each can reasonably place on their co-citizens.
Such judgements do not depend on, nor vary with, whether someone has 'real' metaphysical responsibility: determining whether someone is prudent or hardworking or not does not depend on whether they are 'really' responsible for being so. Thus, insofar as the intuitions of fairness supposedly motivating luck egalitarianism in fact rely on valuing prudence or hard work, and our desire to reward those with these features or penalise those without, 'real' metaphysical responsibility will not track what is valuable. In contrast, on a practice-based approach one could design responsibility practices that reflected the value of prudence or hard work, rewarding those who manifest such traits. For example, interest rates could be increased to reward prudent savers and not imprudent borrowers.
To object, one could just deny that intuitions of fairness track the value of hard work or prudence; instead insisting that ideas of fairness do track 'real' responsibility, metaphysically-speaking. At the least, however, the above casts doubt on the conclusions about fairness reached by metaphysically-minded luck egalitarians: there is a plausible alternative explanation of our intuitions of fairness that does not depend on whether people are really responsible. Further, the values of prudence and hard work explain why many ordinarily think that people should be held responsible, especially considering issues like state
benefits. Yet insofar as luck egalitarians adopt a metaphysical approach, they cannot accommodate these values. To claim that really people care about factors of luck and this motivates their intuitions of fairness appears doubtful, at least as a characterisation of contemporary right-wing politics. The rejection of the relevance of sociological explanations of welfare, for example, is not born of ignorance of these potentially excusing factors.
Consider, for instance, Laurence Mead's attacks on sociological explanations of behaviour being used to excuse the poor and the Daily Mail's comment that, 'the Left views the poor as imbeciles', in response to similar appeals to socio-economic factors as undermining responsibility (Mead, 2008; Mail Online, 2012b ).
So too, there is reason to conduct the debate at the level of these values rather than appeal to 'real' responsibility. To take the traditional metaphysically-minded luck egalitarian approach, or even Dworkin's ordinary metaphysics approach, may be to talk past those who claim that it is important to hold people responsible for failing to find work or for their imprudent decisions, and likewise to reward the prudent or hardworking. Insofar as the latter claims are made on the grounds of values expressed and reflected through responsibility practices, to appeal to genuine choice or to invoke factors of luck is to miss the point of these attributions of responsibility. Obviously, this is not to claim that egalitarians should adopt the judgements of those on the right about benefits claimants but, instead, to claim that a better response from egalitarians would be to engage in debate at the level of these values: to defend a particular conception of how to live together in society.
One might, however, continue to object that underpinning the pull of appeals to fairness is, in fact, the thought that luck shouldn't make a difference. I return to address this in section 3. First, though, I consider the plurality of values that might motivate responsibilitysensitive egalitarianism beyond its core motivations of choice and fairness. Regarding the value of respect, again our responsibility practices capture what is valuable. As described earlier, the value of respect is closely related to the symbolic value of choice and I have argued this best tracks certain important kinds of decisions people make irrespective of any underlying metaphysics. One might object that to hold someone responsible for something they are not really responsible for, metaphysically-speaking, fails to respect them. However, that is not how our practices of respect function: even if no one is responsible in the metaphysical sense of responsibility, to fail to treat someone as a responsible agent would be to disrespect her regardless. As Nagel comments, to deny agency altogether treats a person like an object or thing (1991, pp. 24-38) . As an aside, Dworkin's account also fails to accommodate the plurality of reasons that responsibility practices may be valuable. For example, while his distinction between ambitions and endowments might accommodate intuitions of fairness in cases like the career choice between beach-combing and being a lawyer (Dworkin, 2003, p. 193) , it may not accommodate those regarding prudence; for instance, the person who takes a risky gamble and wins would, on his account, get to keep her winnings (e.g. Dworkin, 2002a To reply, first, the inclusion of values to modify the consequences of choice fails to produce valuable responsibility practices. Instead, one intervenes to mitigate the otherwise unappealing responsibility practice one proposes: one that undermines respect, or fails to value prudence, and so on. Hence, luck egalitarians making the move above still do not give a reason to find the divide between luck and responsibility as itself significant, given that it fails to track the many reasons to find responsibility practices valuable. Nonetheless, it might be further objected that I here assume away the metaphysical alternative, where a judgement of responsibility, or its lack, in itself has significance. The final section of this article addresses one such argument: the claim that the presence of luck itself has significance.
Anti-luck or valuable practices?
A metaphysically-minded luck egalitarian might argue that the arguments above are However, this anti-luck approach threatens to mire luck egalitarians in the very depths of a sceptical problem: aiming to eliminate luck means one ends up immersed in the free will or moral luck problem. For any action or choice for which a person might appear responsible, there is always another factor of luck that threatens to undermine her responsibility. Hence, finding some features or actions for which individuals are 'really' responsible is perhaps an impossible task, given the multitude of factors of luck. 25 Further, one advantage of a practice-based approach is that it may save us from the sceptical problem, since it denies that 'real' responsibility of the kind immune from luck is what should concern us. Instead, we consider what responsibility practices are valuable.
Along Strawsonian lines, one can claim that our practices remain valuable regardless of conclusions about 'real' responsibility, metaphysically-speaking.
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Here, it might be objected that my approach is here inconsistent: our responsibility
practices are precisely what leads to the problem of free will. There is a tension in our practices between valuing holding one another responsible and thinking that factors of luck undermine responsibility for outcomes or actions (e.g. Matravers, 2007) . So, if I want to hold onto the value of our social practices, how can I deny that these very practices also drive us to care about whether there are factors of luck present in the choices people make and in the outcome of those choices? In response, first, our responsibility practices never seek to eliminate all factors of luck: we lack responsibility practices that take the threat of luck undermining any possible attributions of responsibility so seriously, at least, aside from philosophy classrooms. Second, the arguments of this article suggest that the very reasons that these practices have value comes apart from the questions of who is 'really' responsible. The social relations we value produced by holding one another responsible do not require that there are no factors of luck present. Hence, I suggest that the part of our practices that should be revised is the thought that factors of luck should make a difference to our responsibility judgements by themselves, abstract from our purposes in holding responsible, and not the claim that our responsibility practices have value.
Some luck egalitarians might respond, however, that they are untroubled by this sceptical problem, accepting the possibility that everything is a matter of luck. For instance,
Arneson proposes that if everything is a matter of luck, we should just be straightforward egalitarians (2004) . Yet, this threat of sceptical collapse should trouble us. Those accepting it fail to accommodate any of our practices of holding responsible within their theories yet, as this article has argued, we have many reasons to find these practices valuable. Further, antiluck metaphysically-minded luck egalitarianism has nothing going for it, except that it seeks to neutralise luck. On a metaphysical approach, one's distinction between responsibility and luck will most likely not create a responsibility practice tracking the value of choice or our intuitions of fairness, nor one that reflects respect for co-citizens, and so on. As such, such metaphysically-minded, luck-neutralising egalitarians offer an impoverished account of combining equality and responsibility, missing out on the many reasons why catering to responsibility is so important.
Hence, in conclusion, this article proposes that we adopt an alternative approach to understanding responsibility and incorporating it into egalitarianism, one where responsibility is understood as a cluster of differently valuable social practices. The debate within egalitarianism, then, should shift from a focus on genuine choice and eliminating the influence of luck on how life goes, to a discussion of which responsibility practices have value and when. Adopting this approach promises to produce a responsibility-sensitive conception of justice that should also appeal to social egalitarians, given that the significance of responsibility practices largely derives from their effects on social relations.
However, the arguments of this article do not as a result make the significance of considerations of responsibility somehow parasitic or trivial. The position defended is that responsibility practices are valuable and, indeed, worthy of greater consideration by egalitarians: such practices may express or promote central liberal egalitarian values. To focus on our responsibility practices is not to deny the significance of considerations of responsibility, it is instead to reinterpret that significance as grounded in a broader account of how citizens should relate to one another.
